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Abstract We study medical practice variations for nine hospital treatments in the Nether-
lands. Our panel data estimations include various control factors and physician’s role to
explain hospital treatments in about 3,000Dutch zip code regions over the period 2006–2009.
In particular, we exploit the physicians’ remuneration difference—fee-for-service (FFS) ver-
sus salary—to explain the effect of financial incentives on medical production. We find that
utilization rates are higher in geographical areas where more patients are treated by physi-
cians that are paid FFS. This effect is strong for supply sensitive treatments, such as cataracts
and tonsillectomies, while we do not find an effect for non-supply sensitive treatments, such
as hip fractures.
Keywords Medical practice variations · Financial incentives · Hospital treatments ·
Remuneration regulations
JEL I110 · I180
Introduction
Regional differences in medical practice variations have long been studied among health ser-
vices researchers and health economists. Glover (1938) was the first scientist describing the
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variations in tonsillectomies across geographic areas in the UK. Decades later, the Dartmouth
group in the US became widely known and provided evidence for unwarranted regional vari-
ations across a wide array of surgical procedures in the US (see for an extensive overview the
Darthmouth website).1 The seminal paper of Wennberg and Gittelsohn (1973) is considered
the first study on the existence of geographic variations of several surgical procedures. There-
after many more studies appeared that are well documented in Phelps (2000) and Skinner
(2012). Both studies provide an in-depth review of the empirical literature on geographical
variation.
Much of the empirical evidence stems from the Medicare program in the United States.
However in recent years, lots of research on practice variations has been done in different
European countries such as England and the Netherlands (Appleby et al. 2011; Westert et al.
2004).
The main challenge within the practice variation literature is to discriminate between
warranted and unwarranted variation. Unwarranted variation refers to regional differences
that cannot be explained on the basis of illness, strong scientific evidence or the preference
of well-informed patients (Fischer et al. 2008). In practice, however, unwarranted variation
is extremely difficult to isolate from warranted variation (Mercuri and Gafni 2011).
Wennberg (2010) distinguishes threemain categories of care, effective care, price sensitive
care and supply sensitive care. In this paper we study the latter category in which differences
in payment systems across physicians may influence the clinical decisions of physicians, and
thus utilization rates.
That financial incentives play a role in explaining utilization rates is well known (see e.g.
Chandra et al. 2012). A famous example is the anecdotal story by Gawande (2009) who
argues that physicians in Mc Allen, Texas, are more entrepreneurial than physicians in El
Paso, Texas, which results in a dramatic overprovision of several surgical procedures in Mc
Allen. Other well-known examples are related to the impact of changes on payment systems
on a macro level. For example, in 1983, the Medicare program moved from a retrospective,
fee-for-service (FFS) payment to a prospective DRG payment for hospital care. The result
was a drop in volume and a large reduction in total hospital days (Hodgkin and Mc Guire
1994). In the Netherlands, the abolishment of hospital budgets in 2001 led to a sharp increase
in hospital spending and volume, especially for supply sensitive treatments (Vijsel et al.
2011). Chandra et al. (2012) document the growing literature that studies the impact on
utilization rates after exogenous demand shocks or cuts in payments. Many studies find that
physicians are likely to respond to financial incentives (see for a systematic review of the
literature Chaix-Couturier et al. 2000). However, Chandra et al. (2012) state that the role
of fee differences in explaining medical production across patients or geographical areas is
unknown. One major reason for a lack of research in this area is that, under Medicare, all
physicians receive the same type of payment.
We fill this gap in the literature by studying the effect of different physician remunerations
on regional variation in hospital treatments in the Netherlands. Physicians maximize their
utility by not only caring about patient benefits but also by caring about their own income
and leisure time (McGuire 2000). Depending on the type of payments, a physician may
have different choices for these three components, which will subsequently influence patient
benefits and utilization rates. Also selection may play a role. Entrepreneurial physicians may
put a higher weight on income andwill more often choose a FFS than a salary-based payment.
In contrast to Medicare in the US, Dutch physician remunerations differ. Physicians are
paid either FFS or salary, and are not constrained by the hospitals in terms of production. We
1 http://www.dartmouthatlas.org/.
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examine variations in eight supply-sensitive surgical procedures and compare the outcomes
with hip fractures, a procedure forwhichunwarrantedvariation is likely to be small.Moreover,
our panel data set covers the totality of the Dutch population over four consecutive years,
which allows us to estimate fixed and random effect panel data models.
Our results contribute to the evidence that physicians respond to financial incentives.
We show that significantly more patients get treatment in geographical areas with a high
percentage of FFS physicians. This effect is strong for highly supply sensitive treatments,
such as cataracts and tonsillectomies, while we do not find an effect for weakly supply
sensitive treatments, such as hip fractures.
This article is organized as follows: firstwe describe the “Institutional setting” of theDutch
hospital sector, next we describe our “Data and descriptive statistics”. The “Methods” section
explains the estimation procedure and is followed by the “Results” section and “Robustness
checks” section. “Conclusions” section concludes.
Institutional setting
The institutional and regulatory framework of a health care system influence the incentives of
both physicians and patients and, hence, the scope for practice variations (Bickerdyke et al.
2002). Several fairly recent institutional factors make the Dutch healthcare system supply
sensitive.
Consumers are almost fully insured and there are few incentives for patients to restrain
demand.2 Except for emergency care, hospital admission occurs only upon GP referral.3
Throughout our study period almost all patients could freely choose their preferred hospital.4
Patients can thus demand services that provide only a small benefit relative to the costs borne
by the insurer. As a result, the Dutch insurance system makes it attractive for physicians to
stimulate production, as they know patients will have only minor payment concerns.
The government opted in 2006 to liberalize the delivery of health care, including hospital
services. Hospitals are all not-for profit and were historically funded with budgets. In 2001
the strict budgets were replaced by volume-based and open-ended budgets in which “money
follows the patients”. This has led to an increase in inpatient admission rates by more than 3
percent per year from 2001 to 2007, while at the same time day care admissions increased by
about 9 percent annually (Vijsel et al. 2011). Although the main idea of the liberalization of
the health care sector was that health insurers discipline hospitals to deliver care efficiently,
an evaluation concluded that this process is still in its early stages (ZonMw 2009).
In 2005 a new hospital payment system, ‘diagnosis treatment combination’ (DTC), was
implemented. A DTC relies on an episode-based registration within hospitals. A unique
characteristic of the DTC system is the absence of DTC coders, i.e., physicians register
DTCs themselves and can change the DTC registration during the treatment (Steinbusch
2 Dutch citizens pay only 5 percent of their health care expenditures out-of-pocket, one of the lowest con-
tributions of EU member states. During the sample period the annual mandatory deductible for basic benefit
package was e150 for adults (e0 for children). Adults could choose an additional voluntary deductible up to
e500, but only about 5 percent of the population did (NZa 2011).
3 About 63 percent of the patients in Dutch hospitals are referred by a GP. This figure used to be quite stable
but declined to 57.7 percent in 2008 and 60.6 percent in 2009, suggesting that physicians increased the number
of referrals to other physicians (or to themselves) within hospitals.
4 The health care sector in the Netherlands was fundamentally reformed in 2006 with the introduction of
regulated competition . The rationale behind the reform is to stimulate efficiency and curb health care costs
while safeguarding governmental objectives such as affordability, quality, and accessibility. From 2006–2009
one small insurer started to experiment with selective contracting of hospitals.
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et al. 2007). The DTC system was meant to facilitate the role of insurers as purchasers of
care. In 2005, hospitals received a fixed, centrally determined price for initially 90 percent of
theDTCs (part A). The remaining 10 percent (part B) was left to volume and price negotiation
between health insurers and hospitals. Part B was extended from 10 percent in 2005 to 34
percent in 2009.5
Dutch physicians are either self-employed professionals organized by specialty in partner-
ships (FFS physicians) or they receive a salary from the hospital (Schäfer et al. 2010).6 Since
the introduction of DTCs in 2005 FFS physicians received a fixed fee for every treatment.7
The income earned by FFS physicians is mainly determined by their production. Financial
incentives for FFS physicians and hospital management are aligned since the hospital can
also increase revenue by treating more patients.
Salaried physicians receive a monthly fixed wage irrespective of their production.8 We
hypothesize that salaried physicians will put different weights to patient benefits—and there-
fore utilization rates—than FFS physicians. Since the abolition of fixed hospital budgets in
2001 created room for additional production we hypothesize that medical production and
utilization rates will be higher in areas where relatively more patients visit a FFS physician.9
Note that this hypothesis is very different from saying that FFS physicians have a higher
production level than salaried physicians, which is generally true (see “Data and descriptive
statistics” section).
Between 2006 and 2009 the Netherlands had 8 university hospitals and 2 specialty hospi-
tals. General hospitals decreased from 88 in 2006 to 85 in 2009 due to mergers (NZa 2010,
2011). The liberalization of the hospital market led to a concentrated market of general hos-
pitals and a rapid growth of private clinics, often hospital-affiliated. The number of private
clinics increased from 37 in 2005 to 129 in 2009. Private clinics offer only part B treatments
and accounted for about 6 percent of total production (NZa 2010). The opening of new private
clinics or changes in the remuneration schemes or capacity in hospitals creates the variation
in the percentage of different types of physicians visited by patients in Dutch zip code areas.
Data and descriptive statistics
The analysis relies on three data sources: the Dutch Healthcare Authority (NZa) for DTC
information and waiting lists, Statistics Netherlands (CBS) for demographic and socio-
economic factors, and Dutch Hospital Data (DHD) for information on physicians working
in hospitals.
5 Part B was expanded to 70 percent in 2012.
6 Physicians working at university hospitals are salaried. When it comes to general hospitals, physicians can
either receive a salary or FFS.
7 A DTC can be characterized as a bundle of services. FFS physicians were present during the budgeting
system before the year 2000, but this caused tension because the hospital management tried to restrict their
activities (Kruijthof 2005).
8 Although the hospital management may stimulate salaried physicians to increase production, for example
by providing bonusses.
9 The in-patient admission rates increased by more than 3 percent per year from 2001 to 2007, while at
the same time day care admissions increased by about 9 percent annually (Vijsel et al. 2011). Prior to 2008
medical specialists received a lump sum (fixed budget) payment in part A of hospital care. In each hospital the
lump sum was divided among specialists according to past production and fees. As the lump sum was a fixed
amount of money, there were no incentives for specialists to increase the production. The lump sum ceased to
exist in 2008. Since then medical specialists face the same financial incentives in part A and part B of hospital
care.
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DTC data and the construction of treatment density
DTC information for the period 2006–2009 was drawn from administrative data collected
by the NZa (DTC-informatiesysteem DIS). Table 1 provides a summary of our dataset and
description for each treatment: the number of annual DTCs, the patient’s average age, the
percentage of men, the number of hospitals and private clinics performing the treatment, and
our ex-ante expectation on supply sensitivity.
The nine treatments are chosen on the basis of recurrence and supply sensitivity. Recur-
rence is important to obtain enough power for econometric tests. The degree of supply
sensitivity is important to check whether our results are in line with ex-ante medical expec-
tations. According to the consulted medical advisors, the treatments (cataract, tonsillectomy
and varicose veins, hernia, inguinal hernia, arthrosis) are supply sensitive, and hip fracture
is non-supply sensitive.
Our dataset includes about 1.7 million DTCs collected from all Dutch general and univer-
sity hospitals and 78 private clinics. For each DTC we obtained the four-digit zip code of the
patient’s residence as well as the four-digit zip code of the hospital visited by the patient. We
used the four-digit zip codes to construct a panel dataset with zip codes as units and years
as periods. A DTC is opened at the first physician consult and closed at final examination.10
We assign a treatment to the year in which the DTC is opened since about 75 percent of
DTCs are completed within the same year. Each hospital diagnosis corresponds to a homo-
geneous group of unique DTC codes within a medical specialty. Appendix provides further
information on the DTC codes.
Roughly 8 percent of our data contains incomplete DTC records. Some hospitals delivered
incorrect information, such as wrong or non-existent zip codes, which are crucial for the
construction of our panel dataset. We thus deleted a two-digit zip code area when a hospital
in that area delivered incorrect zip codes for more than 20 percent of its treatments in a given
year.11
Our dependent variable, treatment density, is defined as the number of treatments in a four-
digit zip code area divided by the population size,12 which creates a panel data set of repeated
observations for approximately 3,600 four-digit zip code areas for the years 2006–2009. For
very small areas, treatment density shows greater variation and we were confronted with
missing values and outliers.13 According to Diehr et al. (1992) geographical areas should not
be too small; we thus excluded all four-digit zip code areas with less than 500 inhabitants,
losing 1 percent of the total number of DTC records and about 850 four-digit zip code areas.
The final analysis relied on about 3,000 four-digit zip code areas. The descriptive statistics
for treatment density are presented in Table 2.
10 DTCs formally have a maximum length of 365 days. For chronic patients DTCs are automatically closed
after a one year-period and reopened thereafter. Steinbusch et al. (2007) provide more information about DTCs
and their relation to DRGs.
11 Especially in 2006 and 2008 many hospitals often used the non-existent zip code “1,000” for all treat-
ments. During 2006–2009 36 hospitals had non-existent zip codes for more than 20 percent of their DTCs.
Computationally, we followed a similar procedure for all nine treatments and deleted about 400 four-digit zip
code areas for which the first two digits were the same as the hospitals’.
12 The number of inhabitants per four-digit zip code area is obtained from CBS (see “Control variables”
section).
13 The missing values refer to our explanatory variables obtained from CBS (“Control variables” section).
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Table 2 Descriptive statistics of treatment density
Treatment Specialty Average treatment density
2006 2007 2008 2009
Cataract Ophthalmology 7.6 (4.4) 8.5 (4.6) 9.5 (5.2) 8.7 (4.8)
Tonsillectomy Otolaryngology 3.7 (2.1) 3.7 (2.0) 3.3 (1.9) 3.1 (1.9)
Hernia Neurology 2.8 (1.6) 2.9 (1.6) 3.1 (1.8) 3.1 (2.0)
Varicose veins Dermatology 2.2 (2.2) 2.7 (2.3) 3.3 (2.8) 3.4 (2.8)
Varicose veins Surgery 1.6 (1.1) 1.9 (1.3) 2.1 (1.5) 2.1 (1.5)
Inguinal hernia Surgery 1.8 (1.0) 2.0 (1.1) 1.9 (1.1) 1.7 (1.1)
Arthrosis (knee) Orthopedics 1.8 (1.3) 2.0 (1.3) 2.1 (1.5) 2.0 (1.3)
Arthrosis (hip) Orthopedics 1.3 (1.0) 1.4 (1.0) 1.4 (1.1) 1.3 (1.0)
Hip fracture Surgery 0.6 (0.9) 0.6 (0.8) 0.6 (1.0) 0.5 (0.9)
The figures are the average treatment densities per 1,000 inhabitants of the included four-digit zip code areas
in our regressions. The standard deviations are in parentheses
Control variables
From Statistics Netherlands (CBS) we collected demographic and socio-economic data at
four-digit zip code level (see Table 3).14
We included several variables in our analysis that indirectly control for health status.15
The first 20 variables in Table 3 reflect the age distribution for 5-year cohorts per four-digit
zip code. Next, we include information on gender and social and economic status of the
population, the zip codes’ income distribution (three classes of national income distribution:
the lowest 40 percent, the upper 20percent, and themiddle 40percent) anddata on theworking
and self-employed population and people receiving social assistance. We also included four
urbanization levels for each zip code area, defined as the number of addresses per square
kilometre. Another factor that potentially influences regional health care use is the mortality
rate, defined as the number of deceased per 1,000 inhabitants.16
The number of treatments in a geographical area may be associated with the availability
of health care. For example, if the number of providers in an area increases, travel costs
decrease, thereby facilitating access to care. We included the number of hospitals within 20
km as a proxy for hospital availability and three proxies for GP availability, (1) the average
distance to the closest GP, (2) the number of GPs within a radius of three kilometres, and (3)
the average distance to the closest GP centre. In the Netherlands GPs work as gatekeepers;
patients need a referral for hospital admission. For some years data was unavailable (see
Table 3). In those cases we used data for adjacent years as a proxy.
We controlled for excess demand with data on average annual waiting times, which we
obtained from NZa (Table 4). Data was available for six treatments. For hip fractures waiting
14 The information is freely available at www.cbs.nl.
15 Variables directly related to health status are not necessarily preferable in explaining regional variation.
Inhabitants are more likely to receive treatment if their physician treats them more intensively. This bias may
make patients in high treatment areas appear sicker than they actually are.
16 Mortality rate can be viewed as an outcome indicator of health care performances. This is however less
relevant for our analysis since our treatments are in general not life-threatening. As an extra check we ran all
regressions excluding the mortality rate, but this did not influence our results.
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Table 3 Descriptive statistics of 4-digit zip code areas
2006 2007 2008 2009
Total number zip codes 4,007 4,014 4,015 4,019
Number of zip codes included in regressions 2,603 2,640 2,864 2,929
Average population 5,101 5,222 5,020 5,094
Control variables (standard deviation)
age0_5 (%) 6.1 (1.7) 5.9 (1.7) 5.7 (1.7) 5.5 (1.6)
age5_10 6.3 (1.6) 6.3 (1.6) 6.4 (1.6) 6.3 (1.6)
age10_15 6.3 (1.5) 6.3 (1.5) 6.2 (1.5) 6.2 (1.5)
age15_20 6.1 (1.3) 6.2 (1.4) 6.2 (1.3) 6.2 (1.3)
age20_25 5.5 (2.7) 5.5 (2.9) 5.5 (2.9) 5.6 (2.9)
age25_30 5.5 (2.6) 5.4 (2.6) 5.4 (2.6) 5.4 (2.6)
age30_35 6.5 (2.0) 6.1 (2.0) 5.8 (2.0) 5.6 (2.0)
age35_40 7.9 (1.6) 7.8 (1.6) 7.6 (1.6) 7.3 (1.6)
age40_45 8.1 (1.3) 8.1 (1.3) 8.0 (1.3) 8.0 (1.3)
age45_50 7.6 (1.3) 7.7 (1.3) 7.8 (1.3) 7.9 (1.3)
age50_55 7.1 (1.4) 7.1 (1.4) 7.2 (1.4) 7.3 (1.4)
age55_60 7.3 (1.7) 7.1 (1.6) 6.9 (1.5) 6.9 (1.5)
age60_65 5.4 (1.5) 5.9 (1.6) 6.4 (1.7) 6.6 (1.7)
age65_70 4.4 (1.4) 4.5 (1.4) 4.6 (1.4) 4.7 (1.4)
age70_75 3.6 (1.3) 3.6 (1.3) 3.7 (1.3) 3.8 (1.3)
age75_80 2.8 (1.3) 2.9 (1.3) 2.9 (1.3) 3.0 (1.3)
age80_85 2.0 (1.2) 2.0 (1.2) 2.0 (1.2) 2.0 (1.2)
age85_90 1.0 (0.9) 1.0 (0.9) 1.1 (0.9) 1.2 (0.9)
age90_95 0.4 (0.4) 0.4 (0.4) 0.4 (0.4) 0.4 (0.4)
age95 0.1 (0.1) 0.1 (0.1) 0.1 (0.2) 0.1 (0.2)
Men (%) 49.9 (1.8) 49.9 (1.8) 49.9 (1.8) 49.9 (1.8)
Mortality (per 1,000) 7.5 (5.8) 7.4 (5.8) 7.5 (5.6) n/a
Westerns (%) 7.7 (4.9) 7.8 (4.9) 7.8 (4.9) 7.9 (4.9)
Nonwesterns (%) 7.1 (10.6) 7.1 (10.7) 7.2 (10.8) 7.4 (10.9)
Urbanized 3.7 (1.4) 3.6 (1.4) 3.6 (1.4) 3.6 (1.4)
social assistance (per 1,000) 35.4 (37.5) 32.3 (34.8) 29.7 (32.7) 28.9 (31.2)
Lowincome (%) 40.5 (5.9) 40.3 (5.8) n/a 40.2 (6.6)
Highincome (%) 20.5 (7.5) 20.7 (7.5) n/a 19.9 (7.8)
Working (% of population 15–65) 71.3 (6.1) 73.4 (5.9) 74.3 (5.8) n/a
Selfemployed (% of working people) 9.2 (4.5) 9.4 (4.5) 9.5 (4.4) n/a
distGP (km) n/a 1.3 (1.2) 1.4 (1.2) n/a
av3GP (number of GP’s within 3 km) n/a 7.0 (9.9) 6.8 (9.8) n/a
distGPcentre (km) n/a 7.3 (5.1) 7.3 (5.1) n/a
av20hospital (number of hospitals within 20 km) n/a 4.3 (4.1) 4.4 (4.2) n/a
time was less relevant since in most cases treatment is emergent. We calculated the weighted
average waiting time in a four-digit zip code area by weighing waiting times of all hospitals
that patients from a specific zip code visited.
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Table 4 Average waiting times of two-digit zip code areas
Treatment Specialty Average waiting time in weeks
2006 2007 2008 2009
Cataract Ophthalmology 6.6 (2.2) 6.4 (2.4) 6.1 (2.0) 4.9 (2.3)
Tonsillectomy Otolaryngology 5.0 (1.4) 4.7 (1.3) 4.2 (1.2) 3.9(1.3)
Hernia Neurology n/a n/a n/a n/a
Varicose veins Dermatology n/a n/a n/a n/a
Varicose veins Surgery 6.8 (2.2) 6.2 (2.3) 5.6 (2.4) 4.4 (2.1)
Inguinal hernia Surgery 4.6 (1.0) 4.3 (1.2) 4.6 (1.3) 4.3 (1.4)
Arthrosis (knee) Orthopedics 9.8 (3.6) 8.3 (2.6) 7.8 (1.9) 6.7 (2.2)
Arthrosis (hip) Orthopedics 8.3 (2.6) 7.7 (2.0) 7.3 (1.8) 6.8 (2.2)
Hip fracture Surgery n/a n/a n/a n/a
For Hernia (neurology), Varicose veins (dermatology) and Hip fracture (surgery) we did not include waiting
lists in our estimations. The standard deviations are in parentheses
Physician data
We obtained data on the type of physicians from Dutch Hospital Data (DHD). For almost
all individual general and university hospitals we had for each specialty information on their
type of remuneration (FFS versus salary). Themajority of physicians (about 68%on average)
were paid FFS. For both types of salaried physicians, university hospital (UH) physicians
treat on average fewer patients than general hospital (GH) physicians, presumably because
they devote more time to education, research, and more complicated treatments. Kruijthof
Kruijthof (2005) reports that Dutch FFS physicians have longer working hours, devote more
time to patients and have fewer management responsibilities than salaried physicians. One
could argue, however, that this may also be the result of patient selection, such as treating
a higher proportion of short-stay patients (Wright 2007). Longer working hours may also
reflect that FFS physicians put a lower weight on leisure time than salaried physicians.
We constructed the average percentages of physicians visited by patients for each remu-
neration type (see Table 5).17 Interestingly, this approach helped us to provide some extra
information on our data limitations, since this allowed us to identify the share of patients,
about 15 percent on average and for varicose veins about 30 percent, who visited a physician
of an unknown (UN) type. Recall that the majority of UN physicians works in private clinics
and is paid FFS. This enables us to approximate the supply sensitivity effect of physicians
working in private clinics as well.
We defined the average percentages of physicians on the two-digit zip code level. There
are about 90 two-digit zip code areas in the Netherlands. By using a more aggregated zip
code we obtained a smoother pattern without large outliers. Moreover, defining our supply
side variables on the four-digit zip code level was problematic when there are zero patients
treated in a certain area. All percentages would then be zero.When onemore patient is treated
in a certain geographical area, at least one of the percentages becomes positive. This would
create positive artificial correlation between treatment density and the supply side variables.
17 For example, if half of the patients in a two-digit area are treated by a university hospitals and the other
half by hospitals with only FFS physicians then the FFS- and UH-percentage are both 50 percent and the GH-
and UN- percentage are both 0 percent. The average percentages of physicians is also influenced by the fact
that in a few number of hospitals the type of renumeration changed during the sample period.
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The effect of physician remuneration 225
The same reasoning holds for the three-digit zip code level. The disadvantage of aggregating
to a two-digit zip code level is that some variation across areas is lost. However, Table 6
shows that there remains enough between and within variation of the physician percentages.
Methods
Estimation method
We estimated the demand and supply Eq. [1] for each of the nine treatments using OLS,
panel data random effects (RE), and panel data fixed effects (FE):
yit = αi + γt + δGH pGH,i t + δFFS pFFS,i t + δUN pUN,i t + Z ′i tβ + εi t (1)
In Eq. [1], the dependent variable yit is the treatment density in area i in year t . The supply
side variables pθ,i t represent the percentage of physicians of type θ visited by patients from
area i in year t . Recall that the variables pθ,i t vary on the two-digit zip code level, while the
dependent variable varies on the four-digit zip code level. The vector Zit includes the set
of control variables, γt is a year fixed effect, and αi is a constant α (OLS) or an individual
random (RE) or fixed effect (FE) depending on the estimated specification.
The variables of interest are the supply side variables pθ,i t , where we distinguish between
the four physician types (θ = GH, FFS, UN, UH). Note that GH and UH are salaried physi-
cians working at general and university hospitals respectively. FFS are FFS physicians work-
ing at general hospitals. UN are FFS physicians working for private clinics. We excluded the
variable pU H,i t since its inclusion would lead to perfect multicollinearity18. The estimates
of pθ,i t are thus relative to the base category, which is the percentage of patients visiting a
UH physician in area i at year t .
If supply sensitivity does not play a role we expect that δθ = 0; i.e. the type of physician
visited by patients is not related to the treatment density. However, when the remuneration
type of the physician does matter we expect the following two hypotheses to hold.
Hypothesis I treatment density is higher when patients visit relatively more FFS or UN
physicians compared to UH physicians. That is, δF F S > 0 and δU N > 0.
Hypothesis II treatment density is higher when patients visit relativelymore FFS physicians
compared to GH physicians. That is, δF F S > δG H .
Both hypotheses state that FFS and UN physicians have stronger (financial) incentives
to treat more patients than UH and GH physicians. We suppose that the size of the effect is
stronger for supply sensitive treatments. However, for hip fractures financial incentives are
unlikely to play a large role. This leads to the third hypothesis:
Hypothesis III Hypotheses I and II do not hold for the treatment of hip fractures.
Economic effects
The estimated coefficients of interest, δθ , do not provide information about the economic
significance of the supply side effects. Therefore we calculated the marginal effects. The
marginal effects ηθ1−θ2 represent the effect on treatment density of a one percentage point
18 Since
∑
θ pθ,i t = 1.
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increase in pθ1 , while pθ2 decreases simultaneously by one percentage point. The marginal
effects are measured as a percentage change in treatment density compared to the average
treatment density. Formally:






In addition to these baseline estimates, we make several robustness checks. We correct for
patients’ cross border mobility and we tackle the low within variation for UH physicians by
adding the percentage of UH physicians to the percentage of GH physicians. The rationale
behind this is that UH and GH physicians are both paid a fixed salary.
Results
Estimation results
Table 7 presents the full estimation results for cataract surgery. For all nine treatments we
present the estimated coefficients on our variables of interest (pθ,i t ) in Tables 8, 9, and 10.
Column (1) shows the result of an OLS estimation for Eq. [1] where we excluded the
supply side variables pθ,i t . Cataract surgeries occur more frequently in areas with a higher
share of older people. This reflects that mostly aged people need cataract surgery. Treatment
density is lower in areas with relatively more Western immigrants and higher in areas with
relatively more non-Western immigrants. For urbanization we find that the largest effects in
themiddle categories.Waiting time for cataract surgery has a negative impact on the treatment
density, indicating that treatment density is lower in areas with a higher waiting time. The
variables related to distance to the GP have a negative impact on treatment density as well.
For other treatments, the effect of control variables is potentially very different. For instance,
for tonsillectomy we find that treatment density is higher in areas with relatively more people
in the age group 0 to 5 years. Since we are interested in the impact of physician remuneration,
we do not report the full results here, but we limit ourselves to the coefficients of interest.
The regression results for all treatments are available from the authors upon request.
In column (2), (3), and (4) of Tables 7, 8, 9, and 10 we add the physician remuneration
variables. In the OLS and RE specifications we observe only small changes in the estimated
coefficients for the control variables. In the FE model, however, most control variables are
no longer significant because of the low within variation of these explanatory variables.
The physician remuneration variables are positive and highly significant in all three spec-
ifications. Treatment density is higher when patients visited relatively more FFS, GH, or
UN physicians (compared to the UH type). This finding confirms hypothesis I stating that
δF F S > 0 and δU N > 0 for cataract treatments. Note that the estimated coefficients on the
variables pθ,i t are much higher in absolute terms in the FE model.This is related to the fact
that the within variation for UH physicians is low (see Table 6).19 We postpone the discussion
of hypothesis II to the next section where we discuss the economic significance by comparing
the coefficients on the variables pθ,i t .
19 The low within variation for UH physicians makes it difficult to identify the impact of the different
physician remuneration schemes relative to the base category of UH physicians. Note, however, that we are
still able to identify differences between the other types of physicians (GH, FFS, and UN), because within
variation is much higher for these types of physicians.
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Table 7 Estimation results cataract surgery (t-statistics in parentheses)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS OLS RE FE
Percentage_GH 0.047*** 0.048*** 0.270***
(11.8) (11.8) (6.7)
Percentage_FFS 0.060*** 0.065*** 0.294***
(19.1) (19.2) (7.4)
Percentage_UN 0.061*** 0.066*** 0.292***
(17.4) (17.9) (7.4)
Dummy 2007 0.701*** 0.649*** 0.648*** 0.610***
(7.9) (7.4) (7.5) (3.6)
Dummy 2008 1.447*** 1.405*** 1.452*** 1.599***
(12.4) (12.1) (12.7) (6.5)
Dummy 2009 0.403** 0.408** 0.531*** 0.840**
(3.2) (3.3) (4.3) (2.9)
Age75_80 0.837 1.003* 1.074* 1.082
(1.8) (2.1) (2.3) (1.6)
Age80_85 0.978* 1.100* 1.014* 0.752
(2.0) (2.3) (2.1) (1.1)
Men 0.016 −0.024 −0.020 0.019
(0.3) (−0.4) (−0.3) (0.1)
Mortality −0.026 −0.029* −0.019 0.002
(−1.5) (−1.7) (−1.2) (0.1)
Westerns −0.072*** −0.042*** −0.039** 0.042
(−5.3) (−3.4) (−3.2) (0.5)
Nonwesterns 0.026*** 0.027*** 0.026** −0.142
(3.1) (3.3) (3.2) (−1.6)
Urban1 0.188 0.009 0.090 0.312
(0.8) (0.0) (0.4) (0.3)
Urban2 0.492* 0.320 0.339 0.141
(2.3) (1.7) (1.7) (0.1)
Urban3 0.344* 0.228 0.206 −0.310
(2.4) (1.6) (1.5) (−0.9)
Assistance 0.001 −0.001 −0.002 0.006
(0.2) (−0.3) (−0.6) (0.7)
Working 0.002 −0.010 −0.010 0.016
(0.2) (−0.7) (−0.7) (0.3)
Selfemployed −0.026 −0.017 −0.015 −0.168
(−1.5) (−1.0) (−0.9) (−1.7)
Lowincome −0.016 −0.020 −0.017 −0.016
(−0.8) (−1.1) (−1.0) (−0.6)
Highincome −0.002 −0.011 −0.012 −0.049
(−0.2) (−0.9) (−1.1) (−1.6)
Waitingtime −0.096*** −0.063** 0.001 0.072**
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Table 7 continued
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS OLS RE FE
(−4.7) (−3.1) (0.1) (3.0)
distGP −0.127** −0.140** −0.144** 0.614
(−2.6) (−2.9) (−2.9) (1.4)
av3GP −0.008 0.001 0.004 0.001
(−0.5) (0.1) (0.3) (0.0)
distGPcentre −0.024* −0.026* −0.027* −0.115
(−2.1) (−2.3) (−2.4) (−0.5)
av20hospital −0.025* −0.030* −0.031* −0.578**
(−1.8) (−2.1) (−2.2) (−2.9)
Constanta 3.564 −14.210 −18.190 −48.520
(0.1) (−0.3) (−0.4) (−0.8)
Number of
observations
11,036 11,036 11,036 11,036
Number of groups 13,061 13,061
R2 0.466 0.482
R2 within 0.083 0.101
R2 between 0.642 0.187
R2 overall 0.480 0.149
∗ Significant at p < 0.05;
∗∗ significant at p < 0.01;
∗∗∗ significant at p < 0.001
a For the fixed effect model, the constant gives the average value of the fixed effects
In Tables 8, 9, and 10 we show the estimated coefficients on the physician remuneration
variables pθ,i t for all nine treatments. The coefficients in the tables show that hypothesis I is
confirmed in all three models for cataract, tonsillectomy, hernia, and arthrosis (knee and hip).
For varicose veins (surgery) hypothesis I is confirmed in both the OLS and the RE model.
For varicose veins (dermatology) hypothesis I is confirmed in both the RE and the FE model.
For inguinal hernia, hypothesis I is only confirmed in the FE model.
Moreover, we can already conclude that hypothesis I is not confirmed for the treatment of
hip fractures in all three models. The coefficients on the variables pθ,i t are all insignificant
in the three models, except for the coefficient on pG H,i t in the OLS model. This coefficient
is very small and does not have the expected sign. This indicates the the treatment of hip
fractures is not related to the type of physician visited by patients and confirms the first part
of hypothesis III stating that hypothesis I does not hold for the treatment of hip fractures.
With the Breusch and Pagan Lagrange multiplier test we tested the RE model against the
OLSmodel, favouring the REmodel (at a 5 percent significance level) for all nine treatments.
A generalized Hausman test, in turn, rejects the RE model in favour of the FE model in all
cases20. However, we continue to present OLS andRE estimates for reasons of comparison.21
20 We performed this test with Stata, using the xtoverid command (see Schaffer and Stillman 2010).
21 Note, that the OLS and RE estimations provide more stable results and confirm our three hypotheses as
well.
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Economic importance
Table 11 presents themarginal effectsηθ1−θ2 . Since the FEmodel is the preferred specification
we focus on the results in columns (3), (6), and (9) of Table 11.
The results in column (3) (6), and (9) of Table 11 show the economic importance of the
effects. For example, for cataract surgery we find that treatment density increases by 3.4
percent (compared to the average) when the percentage of patients visiting a FFS-physician
increases by one percent and the percentage of patients visiting a UH-physician decreases
by one percent.22 Column (6) of Table 11 shows that this number is 0.27 percent when the
percentage of patients visiting a FFS-physician increases by one percent and the percentage
of patients visiting a GH-physician decreases simultaneously by one percent. We observe
hardly any difference between FFS and UN-physicians for cataract surgery.
Hypothesis II, stating that δF F S > δG H , is confirmed for cataract surgery, tonsillectomy,
hernia, and the treatment of arthrosis (knee) in the FE model (column 6). For these treat-
ments the estimated marginal effect is in the range of 0.17 percent (hernia) to 0.81 percent
(arthrosis–knee). For the other treatments we find insignificant results, indicating that there is
no difference between FFS andGHphysicians.We conclude that for four treatments (cataract,
tonsillectomy, hernia, and knee arthosis) practice variations can be explained by differences
in the remuneration among physicians.
Besides that, it is interesting to investigate how treatment density relates to the percentage
of patients visiting a UN physician. Column (9) of Table 11 shows that UN physicians, who
mainly work in private clinics, perform similarly to FFS physicians.23 However, we find for
the treatment of varicose veins (dermatology) that treatment density is significantly higher
in areas where patients visit relatively more frequently a UN physician rather than a FFS
physician (see column (9) in Table 11). This suggests that for varicose veins private clinics
have increased the number of treatments and that they may have created additional demand.
We also confirm hypothesis III. As already shown in the previous section, none of the
physician remuneration variables pθ,i t has a significant impact on the treatment density of
hip fractures. Moreover, we find no significant differences between the percentage of FFS
and GH physicians in the FE model. In other words, practice variations in hip fractures is
not related to the remuneration of the physicians in our preferred specification. In the OLS
and RE model, hypothesis II is confirmed for hip fractures. This in contrast to hypothesis
III. However, if we take a closer look at the coefficients we see that this results from the fact
that the coefficient on pG H,i t is negative and significant (almost significant in RE) while the
coefficient on pF F S,i t is close to zero and not significant.We conclude that for hip fractures
this difference is not likely to be related to financial incentives of physicians.
22 The marginal effects show the impact on average treatment density. The impact of a 1 percent increase in
the percentage of FFS physicians visited and a 1 percent decrease in the percentage of GH physicians visited
is a 0.27 percent increase of the average treatment density. Since population stays the same, this is equivalent
to a 0.27 percent increase in the number of cataract treatments. The total number of treatment over the period
2006–2009 was just above 580,000 (Tables 1, 2). This would mean that about 1,600 extra cataract treatments
would have been performed, if patients had visisted 1 percent more FFS and 1 percent less GH physicians
over the period 2006–2009.
23 Note that the individual coefficients δU N in Table 10 are all positive and significant, except for varicose
veins (surgery) and hip fractures, indicating that the number of treatments is on average higher when patients
visited relatively more UN physicians compared to UH physicians.
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The effect of physician remuneration 235
Robustness checks
Excluding border areas
Unfortunately, we have no information on cross border mobility. Some patients go abroad for
treatment. Cross-border health care costs represent about 1.2 percent of the total health care
costs in the Netherlands. This could influence our results if treatment densities are measured
incorrectly in border areas. For this reason, we re-run our regressions excluding the 26 two-
digit zip code areas that are adjacent to the Belgian and German border. This reduces the total
number of observations by about 30 percent (to 7,029 nobs). Table 12 shows the marginal
effects resulting from the analysis without border areas. The results are highly comparable
to our previous findings presented in Table 11.
Low within variation for university hospitals
Table 6 shows that the within variation of the percentage of patients visiting a university
hospital is low. Indeed, almost no changes took place on the market of university hospitals
during our sample period. For the other group of hospitals we observe that few hospitals
exited and new hospital entered the market. Moreover, for a small number of hospitals
we observe changes in remuneration schemes of physicians during the sample period. The
low within variation for UH physicians enhances identification problems in the FE model
because identification is solely based on this variation. For example, the estimated marginal
effects ηF F S−U H are much higher in the FE model than in the other models. To circumvent
this problem we add the percentage of UH physicians to the percentage of GH physicians.
The rationale behind this is that UH and GH physicians are both paid a fixed salary.24
Table 13 presents the results, which are in linewith our previous findings. Themarginal effects
ηF F S−(G H+U H) are now a weighted average of the former two marginal effects ηF F S−U H
and ηF F S−G H presented in Table 11. The marginal effects ηF F S−U N do not change very
much compared to the findings in Table 11.
Conclusions
The Dutch government liberalized the provision of hospital services in 2001 by payment
systems that were to a large extent volume-based and open-ended such that “money follows
the patients”. In combinationwith patients facing limited cost-sharing and free hospital choice
these factors led to a strong growth in hospital production.
We showed that physicians respond to financial incentives and these effects appear to
be stronger for supply sensitive treatments. We found that utilization rates are higher in
areas where more patients are treated by FFS physicians. For example, if patients visit one
percent more FFS physicians instead of salaried physicians, then the number of cataract
treatments in that area increases by about 0.27 percent. For treatments of varicose veins
we find that physicians working in private clinics treat even more patients than physicians
working in general hospitals that are paid fee for service. This may suggest a selection effect.
Entrepreneurial physicians will put a high weight on income in their utility function, and are
therefore more likely to be working for private clinics.
24 It should be stressed, however, that the incentives for UH and GH physicians are not identical as explained
in “Data and descriptive statistics” section.
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Table 13 Robustness check GH and UH together
Treatment Specialty ηFFS−(GH+UH) ηFFS−UN
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS RE FE OLS RE FE
Cataract Ophthalmology 0.32*** 0.33*** 0.40*** 0.00 0.00 0.01
Tonsillectomy Otolaryngology 0.28*** 0.31*** 0.51*** −0.05* −0.06** −0.08*
Hernia Neurology 0.31*** 0.28*** 0.18** 0.02 0.03 0.00
Varicose veins Dermatology 0.41*** 0.31*** 0.21** −0.45*** −0.38*** −0.28***
Varicose veins Surgery 0.29*** 0.21*** 0.21 −0.27*** −0.21*** 0.02
Inguinal hernia Surgery 0.13*** 0.14*** 0.24** 0.03 0.02 −0.06
Arthrosis (knee) Orthopedics 0.12* 0.28*** 0.87*** −0.05 0.01 0.11*
Arthrosis (hip) Orthopedics 0.12* 0.11* 0.17 −0.07* −0.07* −0.06
Hip fracture Surgery 0.04 0.13 0.19 −0.09 −0.08 −0.08
∗ Significant difference at p < 0.05; ∗∗ significant difference at p < 0.01; ∗∗∗ significant difference at
p < 0.001 (based on robust standard errors)
We could identify this effect by using exogenous variation for groups of physicians that
face different financial incentives. This variation stems from physicians, hospitals and clin-
ics entering and leaving the market, and from changes in physician remuneration in some
hospitals during the sample period. Moreover, the validity of our results is confirmed by
performing a similar analysis for the treatment of hip fractures. In line with our expectations,
we find that the hip fracture treatment density is not related to physician remuneration.
In this study we were not able to analyse the evolution of the utilization rates before
2005, when the DTC system was introduced in the Netherlands, due to a lack of data and
a different registration of medical conditions. We cannot thus reject the hypothesis that an
uneven treatment intensity, in the years preceding the DTC implementation, could explain
the differences found in the study.
There are many directions for further research. Other supply factors, such as the number
of physicians, the degree of concentration of physicians in hospitals, differences in physician
practices or prices of treatments, may be important as well for explaining practice variations.
It would also add value to have some information on quality of care. Although we find
variation between FFS physicians and salaried physicians we cannot infer that we might be
witnessing poor quality of health care. Also, addingmore control variables, such as the health
status of patients, could improve the results.
From a policy point of view it is hard to say whether it is preferable to have more or less
physicians on FFS. Our results indicate that allowing FFS physicians and private clinics on
the market can be a mixed blessing. On the one hand, these physicians may treat individual
patients more efficiently, but on the other hand, they may treat too many patients. If the
government believes there exists “overtreatment” then replacing FFS physicians by salaried
physicians could be a sensible policy option. However, to answer this question properly
we need more information about the possible differences between FFS, UN physicians and
salaried physicians. Information about the quality of treatments will help policymakers to
make a better decision on having more or less FFS physicians. For example, if it turns out
that FFS and UN physicians are delivering better quality of care than salaried physicians then
this could also be seen as an argument to support more FFS physicians.
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Our finding that supply side factors are related to practice variations may also have impor-
tant policy implications for supply and demand side regulation. First, if hospital management
suspect toomuch production then they could adjust their contracts with physicians. For exam-
ple, regressive tariffs could be introduced to soften production. This strategy, however, will
be difficult to realize since hospital income depends upon production. Second, the option of
being a FFS physician could bemade less attractive. This is currently politically debated in the
Netherlands. Third, insurers could address unwarranted practice variations by benchmarking
hospitals and using managed care activities to discipline physicians. Fourth, unwarranted
practice variations can be mitigated by increasing cost-sharing arrangements for consumers
regarding those supply sensitive treatments.
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Appendix
Description of DTC codes. See Table 14.
Table 14 Description of DTC-codes
Treatment Specialty &
specialty code
Dutch DTC codes Description
Cataract Ophthalmology;
301
X1000554003Y Cataract treatments can essentially be divided
into three categories, day treatment, inpatient
treatment and outpatient treatment. Dutch
medical advisors consider cataract treatments
as highly supply sensitive
X = 1, 2
Y = 1, 2, 3, 6
Tonsillectomy Otolaryngology;
302
X1000052021Y Tonsillectomy can essentially be divided into
three categories, day treatment, inpatient
treatment and outpatient. Dutch medical
advisors consider treatments for tonsillectomy
as highly supply sensitive
X = 1, 2
Y = 1, 2, 3, 6
Hernia Neurology; 330 X100120301YZ Treatment for hernia within neurology is
conservative, i.e. it avoids radical medical
therapeutic measures or operative procedures.
Dutch medical advisors consider treatments
for hernia as supply sensitive
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Dutch DTC codes Description
X = 1, 2
Y = 1, 2, 3
Z = 1, 2, 3
Varicose veins Dermatology;
310
X100002400YZ Treatment for varicose veins can be: laser
treatment to destroy the vein, sclerotherapy to
close off the vein, and surgery to tie off or
remove the vein. These treatments can be
further classified in day treatment versus
inpatient/outpatient treatments. These latter
are used for the most invasive operations.
Dutch medical advisors consider treatments
for varicose veins as highly supply sensitive
X = 1, 2
Y = 3, 4, 5, 8, 9
Z = 1, 2, 3
Varicose veins Surgery; 303 110004230X0Y Treatment for varicose veins can be: laser
treatment to destroy the vein, sclerotherapy to
close off the vein, and surgery to tie off or
remove the vein. These treatments can be
further classified in day treatment versus
inpatient/outpatient treatments. These latter
are used for the most invasive operations.
Dutch medical advisors consider treatments
for varicose veins as highly supply sensitive
X = 2, 4
Y = 1, 2, 3, 6
Inguinal hernia Surgery; 303 110001210X0Y Inguinal hernia can be treated with an
endoscopic/minimal invasive surgery—usually
for relatively easier cases—or with
open/classic surgery, which is more invasive.
Dutch medical advisors consider treatments
for inguinal hernia as supply sensitive
X =2, 3, 4, 5
Y =1, 2, 3
Arthrosis (knee) Orthopedics;
305
X100180102YZ Arthrosis of the knee can be treated with or
without intervention/operation. Also, the
operation can include prosthesis or not. Dutch
medical advisors consider treatments for
arthrosis (knee) as supply sensitive
X =1, 2
Y =1, 2
Z =1, 2, 3, 6
Arthrosis (hip) Orthopedics;
305
X100170102YZ Arthrosis of the hip can be treated with or
without intervention/operation. Also, the
operation can include prosthesis or not. Dutch
medical advisors consider treatments for
arthrosis (hip) as supply sensitive
X =1, 2
Y =1, 2
Z =1, 2, 3, 6
Hip fracture Surgery; 303 110002180X03 Most hip fractures are treated by orthopedic
surgery, which involves implanting an orthosis.
If operative treatment is refused or the risks of
surgery are considered to be too high the main
emphasis of treatment is on pain relief. Dutch
medical advisors consider treatments for hip
fractures as weakly supply sensitiveX =2, 4
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